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There is an intimate relationship between consciousness and the notion of self. By studying
patients with disorders of consciousness, we are offered with a unique lesion approach to
tackle the neural correlates of self in the absence of subjective reports. Studies employing
neuroimaging techniques point to the critical involvement of midline anterior and poste-
rior cortices in response to the passive presentation of self-referential stimuli, such as
the patient’s own name and own face. Also, resting state studies show that these mid-
line regions are severely impaired as a function of the level of consciousness. Theoretical
frameworks combining all this progress surpass the functional localization of self-related
cognition and suggest a dynamic system-level approach to the phenomenological complex-
ity of subjectivity. Importantly for non-communicating patients suffering from disorders
of consciousness, the clinical translation of these technologies will allow medical pro-
fessionals and families to better comprehend these disorders and plan efficient medical
management for these patients.
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(SELF) CONSCIOUSNESS IN NON-COMMUNICATING
CONDITIONS
The scientific study of consciousness dictates that there is an inti-
mate relationship between the mind and the brain (Feinberg, 2000;
John, 2002; Freeman, 2007; Tononi and Laureys, 2009; Fingelkurts
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, besides several attempts to define it, con-
sciousness remains a difficult term to describe and different people
may think differently about it (Demertzi et al., 2009). Here, we will
define consciousness in an operational manner, namely conscious-
ness is what is lost during dreamless sleep (Tononi, 2004). As such,
consciousness is a matter of both waking states and experience,
so that the less awake we get the less aware we become of our
surroundings and ourselves.
Based on this definition, patients in coma are not conscious
because they cannot be awakened. The linear relationship between
wakefulness and awareness is violated in cases of severely brain-
damaged patients who are in a vegetative state (VS) and minimally
conscious state (MCS). Indeed, patients is VS, also coined as
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS; Laureys et al., 2010),
maintain awaking periods as evidenced by eye-opening and they
will never respond to any visual, somatosensory,or auditory stimu-
lation indicative of preserved awareness (Jennett and Plum, 1972).
On the other hand, patients in MCS show fluctuating signs of
awareness and non-reflex behaviors, such as visual pursuit and
command following (Giacino et al., 2002). Importantly, in both
clinical conditions patients remain unable to communicate with
their environment in a functional manner. In the absence of sub-
jective reports, how can one know whether patients in VS/UWS
and MCS experience something and what these experiences are? In
other words, can one claim that these patients retain a type of “core
consciousness,” which provides them with a sense of self about
here and now? (Damasio and Meyer, 2009). We think that the
study of patients with disorders of consciousness offers a unique
lesion approach to tackle the necessary neural correlates of self-
consciousness. Our rationale lies on the argument that since clin-
ical diagnosis shows that patients hold no subjective experience,
the absence of subjective identity will be eventually reflected in
patients’ brain function. As these patients are not able to commu-
nicate or show high-level cognitive function, we will here refer to
self-consciousness as to its basic expression. In other words, as self-
detection, namely when an organism can respond to stimuli with
which is directly implicated or modify its behavior in ways which
imply awareness of its own actions (Zeman, 2001). Accordingly,
the employed experimental paradigms refer to the administration
of self-referential stimuli (patients’ own name and own face) and
the subsequent measure of brain responses to these stimuli with
neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques. The excellent
spatial resolution which is offered by functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET),
permits to better “localize” self-referential brain activity. There-
fore, we will here focus on studies employing these neuroimaging
methods to study residual self-consciousness in patients with dis-
orders of consciousness. To date, such functional neuroimaging
studies point to the critical recruitment of anterior and poste-
rior midline cerebral areas in experimental paradigms employing
self-referential stimuli. Activation of these midline regions is fur-
ther observed during resting state conditions in healthy volunteers.
This has led to the suggestion of a link between resting state activity
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and unconstraint self-related mentation. We will review these
studies in patients and healthy controls, discuss the involvement of
midline areas to the notion of self in patients and will propose that
self-related cognition might be a matter of a system-level dynamic
activity rather than activation of specific brain areas.
ASSESSING SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN
NON-COMMUNICATING PATIENTS
Clinicians are offered with various clinical scales to detect sings of
awareness at the bedside (Majerus et al., 2005). The Coma Recov-
ery Scale-Revised (Giacino et al., 2004) is one of the most sensitive
tool to diagnose and differentiate between patients in VS/UWS
and MCS because it assesses all the defining criteria for MCS, such
as visual pursuit (Seel et al., 2010). Nonetheless, it is not only a cer-
tain behavior that needs to be detected, but the way this is assessed
seems to be equally important. For example, when visual pursuit
was tested by means of a moving object, a moving person, and a
moving mirror, more patients tracked their image in the mirror
compared the other two stimuli and were hence considered as in
a MCS (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2008). Similarly, to score sound
localization with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, patients need
to orient their head or eyes toward the source of the sound. When
the patients’ own names were used, more oriented their head or
eyes toward the examiner compared to the meaningless sound of
a ringing bell (Cheng et al., 2013). These studies imply that self-
referential stimuli are more effective to explore patients’ respon-
siveness and can influence the diagnostic process (also, see Laureys
et al., 2007). To what degree, however, can one claim that these
paradigms also reflect the, indirect, assessment of residual self-
consciousness in this non-communicating clinical population?
One way to approach the answer is to measure patients’ brain
responses and activation during sensitive experimental manipu-
lations and compare them with that of healthy controls. If the
cerebral pattern is indistinguishable between the two groups,
then one has good reasons to believe that the extracted statisti-
cal maps reflect the same construct (Owen, 2013). Naturally, there
are emerging legitimate concerns about the degree of confidence
one can have on functional neuroimaging results, especially in
the absence of subjective reports (e.g., Fins and Schiff, 2010).
In addition, our limited understanding of the dynamic neural
complexity underlying consciousness and its resistance to quantifi-
cation in the absence of communication (Seth et al., 2008) makes
it difficult to establish strong claims about self-consciousness in
non-communicating patients. Nevertheless, the use of these tech-
nologies have shed light on the gray zones between the different
clinical entities of consciousness and have revealed that not all
patients can be considered unresponsive (Laureys and Boly, 2008;
Gantner et al., 2012). For example, fMRI has been used to assist the
diagnosis of patients with disorders of consciousness (Coleman
et al., 2009), to detect preserved awareness in behaviorally unre-
sponsive patients (Owen et al., 2006), and even to communicate
with them (Monti et al., 2010).
Due to the difficulty to control voluntary eye-opening of
patients, most neuroimaging studies employing self-referential
stimuli restrict to the auditory modality (Table 1). In a PET study
with one patient in MCS, the patient’s own name was presented
next to baby cries and meaningless noise (Laureys et al., 2004). Pas-
sive listening to the own name recruited the activation of midline
areas, such as precuneus and anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cor-
tex next to lateral parietal areas including language-related regions,
such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s. Another n= 1 study with a patient
in VS/UWS utilizing fMRI also showed that passive listening to the
own name compared to other names, encompassed the activation
of the medial prefrontal cortex bilaterally in parallel to temporo-
parietal and superior frontal cortices (Staffen et al., 2006). Includ-
ing more patients (n= 11), it was shown that all four patients in
MCS and six patients in VS/UWS showed cerebral responses to
their own names either in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) or
in the caudal part of the ACC or the supplementary motor area
(predefined regions based on brain responses of healthy controls)
(Qin et al., 2010). Interestingly, those two patients in VS/UWS
who exhibited activity in the caudal ACC evolved to a MCS at
a 3-month follow up. Similarly, two patients in VS/UWS when
listening to their own name showed cerebral activation extend-
ing to associative auditory cortex and also recovered to MCS (Di
et al., 2007). Such brain activations, however, are atypical of the
VS/UWS. Indeed, it has been shown that auditory processing of
simple stimuli in VS/UWS refers to the activation of only auditory
primary cortices whereas hierarchically higher-order multi-modal
association areas are not activated (Laureys et al., 2000; Boly et al.,
2004). Although caution should be paid on the accurate behav-
ioral evaluation of these patients with standardized tools, like the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (Table 1), there are cases of unre-
sponsive patients where functional neuroimaging can precede the
clinic (e.g., Owen et al., 2006). Taken together, these studies suggest
that when activity of the anterior midline areas is recruited using
the own name paradigm, this can work as prognostic marker (for
a review, see Di et al., 2008).
Apart from activation studies utilizing self-referential stimuli,
increasing attention has been paid to spontaneous brain activ-
ity and its significance to self-related cognition. During resting
state, a set of brain areas encompassing precuneus, medial pre-
frontal cortex and bilateral temporo-parietal junctions have been
shown to work by default, when subjects do not perform any
task (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). This default mode network
(DMN) of areas in healthy controls has been related to inter-
nally oriented cognitive content, such as self-referential or social
cognition, mind-wandering, and autobiographical memory recall
(e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al.,
2008; Schilbach et al., 2008; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Such
intrinsic cerebral activity also seems to be implicated in conscious-
ness processes. For example, in brain death, where all brainstem
reflexes are lost parallel to continuous cessation of respiration,
functional connectivity in the DMN is absent (Boly et al., 2009),
or attributed merely to motion artifacts (Soddu et al., 2011). Coma
patients show no identifiable fMRI DMN connectivity and in those
patients where such connectivity can be detected may indicate sub-
sequent recovery of consciousness (Norton et al., 2012). In patients
with disorders of consciousness, such fMRI DMN connectivity is
partially preserved yet severely disrupted, showing consciousness
level-dependent decreases when moving from healthy controls to
patients in MCS, VS/UWS, and coma (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2010). Interestingly, EEG studies have corroborated these findings:
it has been shown that the strength of DMN EEG synchrony
was smallest or even absent in patients in VS/UWS, intermedi-
ate in patients in MCS, and highest in healthy fully self-conscious
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Table 1 | Studies showing brain responses to the presentation of self-referential stimuli in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS) by means of positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques (*indicates prognostic value).
Technique Patients Coma recovery
scale-revised
assessment?
Experimental contrast Implicated brain regions Reference
fMRI 4 MCS,
7 UWS
Yes Passive listening to own
name by familiar voice
In predefined regions of ACC, cACC, and SMA: Qin et al.
(2010)• In all 4 MCS and six UWS: signal changes in at least one
the three regions
• In 2 UWS: activity in cACC (clinical improvement to MCS
at three-month follow up)*
fMRI 4 MCS,
7 UWS
Yes Passive listening to own
name by familiar voice vs.
baseline (machine noise)
• In all 4 MCS: primary auditory cortex extending to
associative auditory cortex
• In 2 UWS: no activation
Di et al.
(2007)
In 3 UWS: primary auditory cortex
In 2 UWS: primary auditory cortex extending to
associative auditory cortex (clinical improvement to MCS
at three-month follow up)*
fMRI 1 UWS No Passive listening to own vs.
other names
Medial prefrontal cortex bilaterally (also activation in L
temporo-parietal and superior frontal cortices)
Staffen
et al. (2006)
PET 1 MCS Yes Passive listening to own name Precuneus and anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cortex (also
activation in bilateral angular gyri, R temporo-parietal
junction, L dorsal prefrontal regions and Broca’s area,
bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci and dorsal superior
temporal gyri, encompassing Wernicke’s area)
Laureys
et al. (2004)
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; cACC, caudal part of the anterior cingulate cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area.
subjects (Fingelkurts et al., 2012). Similarly, brain metabolism
in these midline structures is severely disrupted in patients in
VS/UWS and MCS compared to patients who have emerged from
the MCS or are in a locked-in syndrome (Figure 1; Thibaut et al.,
2012). It has been further proposed that deactivation of the DMN
is supposed to reflect interruptions of introspective processes.
Such investigation in patients showed that, compared to healthy
controls, deactivation in medial regions of the DMN was absent
in patients in VS/UWS and reduced in patients in MCS (Crone
et al., 2011). Taken together, studies of spontaneous activity in
patients suggest that changes in the DMN functional connectivity
could suggest modified self-related conscious mentation. Indeed,
it has been suggested that in normal waking conditions, resting
state activity in the posterior cingulate, and frontal areas accounts
for self-referential thoughts (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011; Fin-
gelkurts et al., 2012). Therefore, it could be inferred that decreased
connectivity in these midline regions of the DMN reflects, at least
to certain degree, restricted abilities for self-referential processing
in patients with disorders of consciousness.
THE SELF AS A PRODUCT OF A DYNAMIC SYSTEM
APPROACH
Since the early studies of resting state, it has been suggested that the
brain’s baseline activity can be organized in two brain networks
showing anticorrelated activity to each other: an “intrinsic” and
an “extrinsic” network (Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Golland
et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007). The “intrinsic” network coincides
FIGURE 1 | Metabolic activity in medial precuneus (MP) and
mesiofrontal (MF) cortex is severely impaired in patients with
disorders of consciousness, such as in vegetative state/unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state. Of note is that
patients who have emerged from the minimally conscious state (who yet
experience confusion and amnesia syndromes) show metabolic
dysfunction only in the posterior cingulate and adjacent retrosplenial cortex
but not in the lateral frontoparietal network (see text). Finally, fully
conscious yet severely paralyzed patients with locked-in syndrome do not
show metabolic impairment in any of these areas, suggesting a critical
involvement of midline regions in supporting self-related cognition (figure
adapted from Thibaut et al., 2012).
with the DMN and is involved in the same cognitive processes as
the DMN. The “extrinsic” system encompasses lateral frontopari-
etal areas resembling the brain activations during goal-directed
behavior and it has been linked to cognitive processes of external
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sensory input, such as somatosensory (e.g., Boly et al., 2007), visual
(e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), and auditory (e.g., Brunetti
et al., 2008). Previous studies showed that these two systems are of
a competing character in the sense that they can disturb or even
interrupt each other (e.g., Tian et al., 2007). Such anticorrelated
pattern is also illustrated in activation studies on motor perfor-
mance (Fox et al., 2007), perceptual discrimination (Sapir et al.,
2005), attentional lapses (Weissman et al., 2006), and somatosen-
sory perception of stimuli close to somatosensory threshold (Boly
et al., 2007).
We have recently proposed that these two systems may account
for the phenomenological complexity of awareness. In particular,
it is proposed that awareness, or the contents of consciousness,
can be reduced to two components, namely the “external” aware-
ness or everything we perceive through our senses (what we see,
hear, feel, smell, and taste) and “internal” awareness or stimulus-
independent thoughts (Demertzi et al., 2013). Interestingly, the
switch between the external and internal milieu was found not
only to characterize overt behavioral reports but also had a cerebral
correlate (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). More particularly, it was
shown that behavioral reports of internal awareness were linked
to the activity of midline anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal areas as
well as posterior cingulate/precuneal cortices. Conversely, subjec-
tive ratings for external awareness correlated with the activity of
lateral fronto-parieto-temporal regions. These findings highlight
that the anticorrelated pattern between the internal and external
awareness system is of functional relevance to conscious cognition.
Indeed, in an altered conscious state like hypnosis, where subjects
report awareness alterations but remain fully responsive, hypnosis-
related reductions in functional connectivity were shown in the
external awareness system parallel to subjective ratings of increased
sense of dissociation from the environment and reduced intensity
of thoughts about external events (Demertzi et al., 2011). Similar
reductions in external awareness systems have been also shown for
non-responsive conditions, such as deep sleep and anesthesia (for
a review, see Heine et al., 2012).
Analysis of metabolic activity obtained in VS/UWS patients
compared to healthy controls or comparisons with recovery of
awareness (i.e., within-subject), have highlighted the critical role
of a widespread fronto-temporo-parietal associative cortical net-
work (Thibaut et al., 2012). Recent PET data indicate that recovery
of MCS patients seems to be accompanied by a right-lateralized
recovery of the external awareness network whereas the presence of
command following, defining the MCS plus (Bruno et al., 2011),
classically parallels the recovery of the dominant left-lateralized
language network (Bruno et al., 2012). Similar results have been
observed in slow wave sleep and general anesthesia (for review,
see Boveroux et al., 2008). Interestingly, these findings are also
confirmed in transient dissociative states of unresponsive wakeful-
ness, such as absence seizures, complex partial seizures, or sleep-
walking – all characterized by preserved automatic reflex motor
behavior in the absence of response to commands and show-
ing transient impaired activity in these fronto-temporo-parietal
associative areas (Laureys, 2005; Blumenfeld, 2012).
According to a suggested framework taking the external and
internal awareness systems into account, two complementary
states of system imbalance are possible, where one system can be
in a hyperfunctional state, while the other is hypoactive. Extrinsic
system hyperfunction is expected to lead to a state of total senso-
rimotor absorption or “lost self.” In contrast, intrinsic or default
system hyperfunction is expected to lead to a state of complete
detachment from the external world. A state where both extrin-
sic and intrinsic systems are hypofunctional is predicted to lead
to markedly impaired consciousness as seen in disorders of con-
sciousness (Soddu et al., 2009). A more recent proposal, adopting
a similar system-level approach, points to the functional separa-
tion of the dorsal and ventral subcomponents of the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC): the ventral PCC appears to be highly inte-
grated within the DMN, and is involved in internally directed
cognition (e.g., memory retrieval and planning) whereas the dor-
sal PCC shows a highly complex pattern of connectivity, with
prominent connections to the frontal lobes (Leech et al., 2012).
According to the suggested model, differential regional activity
can be explained by considering the arousal state, the milieu of
attention (internal vs. external) and the breadth of attention (nar-
row vs. broad) (Leech and Sharp, 2013). The model proposes that
through its interactions with the prefrontal cortex, the dorsal PCC
is involved in controlling attentional focus. Hence, interactions of
these PCC sub-regions with other intrinsic connectivity networks
are then involved in shifting the balance of attention along an
internal/external and broad/narrow dimension (Leech and Sharp,
2013).
Taken together these studies indicate that DMN and anti-
correlated external awareness system activity underlies (at least
partially) conscious ongoing mentation. It should be mentioned
that fMRI anticorrelations were previously subject to debate in
the literature. It has been argued, for instance, that fMRI func-
tional anticorrelations are nothing more than noise in the signal
due to regression of the brain’s global activity during data pre-
processing (Anderson et al., 2011). Other data, however, suggest
that the anticorrelations persist both with and without global sig-
nal regression, suggesting some underlying biological origins for
this anticorrelated pattern (Fox et al., 2009; Chai et al., 2012). We
would agree with the latter evidence which is supported by studies
in unconscious conditions, such as anesthesia, sleep, and in unre-
sponsive patients (Boly et al., 2009) where these anticorrelations
generally reduce or even disappear, accounting for their functional
contribution to conscious cognition.
CONCLUSION
Neuroimaging activation and resting state studies indicate an
indirect measure of self-related cognition encompassing midline
and lateral frontoparietal areas. Furthermore, such studies have
recently shown a much more complex, dynamic, and multifac-
eted architecture of brain functional connectivity in the emergence
of consciousness than previously thought. Importantly for non-
communicating patients suffering from disorders of conscious-
ness, such neuroimaging measurements are of medical and ethical
importance (Jox et al., 2012). What remains to be determined
is the clinical translation of these technologies which will allow
medical professionals and families to better comprehend these
disorders, plan efficient medical management, and in a far reach-
ing perspective, to acquire new opportunities to restore their brain
functions.
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